To complete the deception, radio specialists created fake radio traffic and Morse code, knowing that the opposition would be listening. The engineers mimicked and recorded actual sounds from a base and created playback broadcasters ( Beyer, 2013). Thus if enemy scouts were sent out to investigate the positions of the American camps, they would hear normal sounds and acoustics coming from the empty compounds generated from speakers and amplifiers. In addition to the inflatables and painted landscape “special effects,” the Ghost Army used sound to further exploit their deception. According to Beyer and Sayles (2015), the Ghost Army was broken into three specialties or units: 1) visual deception conducted by the 603rd Camouflage Engineers 2) sonic deception conducted by the 3132 Signal Service Company Special and 3) radio deception conducted by the Signal Company. Painters added tread marks in the ground to simulate truck and tank movements within the camps and runways complete with aircraft skid marks ( Beyer, 2013). These newly fabricated Army units included such artistry to assist in believability of the battlefield deception. Photograph-Compliments of the National Archive. World war II ghost army created inflatable tanks to fool german reconnaissance. Ford has an entire “camouflage team” that works with various other concealment techniques so that corporate spies and others armed with video cameras cannot get a glimpse of their new vehicles before they are officially unveiled.įigure 6.3. This type of misdirection helps Ford hide the actual design of the car. According to Ford Motor Company (2016), camera technology is only going to become more advanced, and it is necessary for the company to maintain their competitive edge by implementing camouflage in the form of vinyl stickers with patterns that trick the eye and create optical illusions. Recently, the Ford Motor Company deployed a CI technique that allowed the company to test drive prototyped models on public roadways but prevented the autos from accurately being photographed or captured on video ( MacDonald, 2016). Law enforcement agencies and large commercial companies also employ CI to their respective missions. In the intelligence world, the acronym “CI” typically refers to counterintelligence. Max Kilger, in Deception in the Digital Age, 2017 Going on the Offensive: Deceiving Video In the interim, companies should give favorable consideration to adopting a mode of sustaining control, use, ownership, and monitoring the value, materiality, and risks to their proprietary intellectual and structural capital-that is, their intangible assets.Ĭameron H. One potential “patch” to these threats is that the complexities of personnel policies, procedures, practices, laws, and monitoring must be revisited. If such propensities are contemplated and coincide with or become exacerbated by conventional motivators, such as disgruntlement, unmet expectations, personal predispositions, or personal finance stressors, the challenges presented by these threats become more acute and immediate. Certain factors can affect an employee’s propensity to engage in information asset theft or economic espionage, by encouraging a receptivity to external buyers and solicitors of intangible assets, and/or prompt them to actively independently seek out prospective buyers. There is a need to identify and assess factors that are related to employee reactions to the intensity and frequency of being targeted and solicited by external adversaries to engage in theft, misappropriation, or economic espionage of proprietary know-how and intellectual property. These and other studies, for many of us, prompt additional questions about economic and competitive-advantage adversaries, including insiders.
A consequence is that it is increasingly difficult to accurately measure the extent of espionage and illegal acquisitions of U.S. Also, companies encouraging outsourcing of their R&D and establishing foreign bases of operation, providing foreign entities with more opportunities to target U.S. What is particularly new in ONCIX’s most recent report ( Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011) are remarks regarding the increasing new modes of communication and social networking that provide uncharted opportunities for transferring information, and spying by enterprising foreign intelligence services.
Since 1995, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) has been mandated to gather data and submit an annual report to Congress on the state of foreign economic intelligence collection, industrial espionage, and export control violations.ĭata for the report is collected from government agencies that comprise the U.S. Moberly, in Safeguarding Intangible Assets, 2014 Office of National Counterintelligence Executive